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This paper investigates empirically the role of taxes on labor for the stock of expatriates and 
the migration flows of skilled workers. Given the increasing mobility of labour, especially of 
high-skilled people and expatriates, it is interesting to see to what extent labour income taxes 
and social security contributions determine migration flows. We collect data on personal 
income tax profiles for 49 economies and the year 2002. In particular, we determine the 
component of labor taxes which is borne by employers and the one that is borne by 
employees, following the OECD’s Taxing Wages Approach. For the latter, we calculate the 
progressivity of personal income tax rates between the average wage and five times the 
average wage. This may be interpreted as the tax progression which is relevant for well-paid 
workers. Then, we use the personal income tax variables to estimate their effect on bilateral 
stocks of expatriates into OECD countries and the migration of skilled workers into these 
countries. Personal income tax rates turn out to have a robust negative effect on cross-border 
flows of skilled workers in the OECD. 
JEL Code: J61, H24, F22. 







Ifo Institute for Economic Research at 





Doina Maria Radulescu 
Center for Economic Studies and CESifo 









November 24, 2008 1 Introduction
‘Taxation can be used as a means of attracting the most highly skilled foreign work-
ers.’ (OECD, Recent Trends in International Migration, Paris 2007, p.120)
The increasing mobility of people across international borders— especially the
one of highly skilled workers and that of expatriates—raises the question about
the role of taxes for cross-border migration. Apart from personal characteristics
determining an individual’s mobility and job opportunities at home and abroad as
such, net wages are clearly a key factor for the migration decision. For instance,
achieving a successful career within a multinational ﬁrm is often only possible when
accepting positions abroad. In any case, a fairly large variance in personal income
tax rates across countries at diﬀerent income brackets renders the gross wage not
quite informative about a worker’s net income at home and abroad. And this is
where tax rates as such but also other instruments related to the tax system (such as
social security contributions, etc.)—altogether, we may refer to them as the eﬀective
tax burden—come into play as possibly likely determinants of ﬂows of migrants and
expatriates.
Data suggest that countries diﬀer remarkably with regard to the income tax
burden on highly skilled workers. In particular, this is the case through high personal
income tax rates and the personal income tax progression between average income
earners and ones with a particularly high income (we choose a value of 500% of
the average income to shed light on the matter).1 We claim that personal income
tax rates are responsible not only for the investment in human capital but also the
location thereof across borders, hence, skilled labor migration.
The empirical question we focus on here is to which extent personal income
taxation inﬂuences migration decisions of individuals with above average skills. We
shed light on this matter in a cross-section of country-pairs. More speciﬁcally, we
follow the Taxing Wages Approach of the OECD (see Heady, 2004) to determine
the average eﬀective tax burden on labor which includes state and local income
taxes as well as social security contributions. This approach allows decomposing
countries’ tax proﬁles into the component borne by employers and the one borne
by employees. Speciﬁcally, we compute the tax wedge for a single employee earning
1In this paper we focus on the benchmark income tax burden levied by a country on well-paid
labor. It is well known that some countries (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and United Kingdom) explicitly provide special
treatment for expatriates (see OECD, 2005). However, a detailed analysis of the latter is beyond
the scope of this paper, since the country sample used our empirical analysis is by far larger than
what information on special tax treatment of expatriates is available for.
2100% and 500% of the average wage in the manufacturing sector for 49 economies.
Besides average tax levels, we also determine the role of a tax system’s degree of
labor tax progressivity. Using the obtained eﬀective tax rates and data on inward
migration of skilled workers into OECD countries by country of origin for the year
2002, we obtain a number of interesting results. First, a higher resident-to-source
country diﬀerential of eﬀective tax burden on individuals earning the average wage
is associated with a larger number of migrants into the resident country. Second, a
higher resident-to-source country diﬀerential in the personal income tax progressivity
is likewise associated with a larger number of skilled migrants into the resident
country. Hence, empirical evidence provides support for our claim and suggests
that politicians—at least in the developed economies—should account for the role
of personal income tax policy for the location of knowledge-capital.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the liter-
ature on migration of highly-skilled workers as well as that on the impact of taxes
on migration. Section 3 presents the OECD’s Taxing Wages Approach we rely upon
and provides descriptive statistics on the eﬀective taxation of individuals in our
sample of countries. The ﬁndings from the empirical analysis of the impact of labor
taxes on migration are summarized in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with
a summary of the most important ﬁndings.
2 Review of the Empirical Literature
Among the papers which markedly inﬂuenced the literature on migration are the
seminal contributions by Borjas (1987, 1994), who introduced the concept of ‘self-
selection’ in migration theory. One of the key hypotheses from self-selection theory is
that poor countries with an uneven wage distribution will face a ‘negative selection’
of immigrants such that individuals with below-average skills are most likely to
migrate. The opposite is true for rich countries, where a ‘positive selection’ of
immigrants mainly leads to a migration of workers with above-average skill level.
One of the major assumptions Borjas’ analysis relies upon, is that migration costs do
not diﬀer among skill levels. However, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) provide evidence
that migration costs do diﬀer among skill groups and show that positive selection of
migrants even occurs in poor countries such as Mexico. Thus, the recent empirical
literature provides increasing support for the ‘positive selection’ of migrants and,
hence, cross-border ﬂows of skilled workers (see Chiswick, 1999; Liebig and Sousa-
Poza, 2004; and Grogger and Hanson, 2008).
Another aspect highlighted in the literature relates to the so-called ‘positive sort-
3ing’ of migrants. According to Grogger and Hanson (2008), highly skilled emigrants
are more likely to migrate to countries with higher rewards to skilled-relative-to-
unskilled labour. In the context of the present study, this positive sorting is not
only concerned with the diﬀerence between gross wage rates in the resident and
source countries, but also with the diﬀerence in the respective personal income tax
burden, since this measure aﬀects net wages.
With regard to the nexus of personal income taxation and migration, a number
of studies directly or indirectly address this issue. However, previous work does not
focus on international migration but on the location of inhabitants in Switzerland.
For instance, the studies by Kirchg¨ assner and Pommerehne (1996) and Feld and
Kirchg¨ assner (2001), suggest that income taxation inﬂuences the spread of people
with high incomes across Swiss cantons. However, rather than considering migration
itself, the aforementioned work assesses the nexus between income taxation and
location of tax payers in general. Moreover, this work does not relate to income
taxation and the location (or migration) of highly skilled workers but rather on the
spatial location of workers in diﬀerent income tax brackets.
The aim of our research is complementary to the one referred to in the previous
paragraph. Rather than considering the spread of workers within countries, we
focus on the role played by income taxation for migration ﬂows across international
borders. And in particular, we consider the role played by personal income taxation
for the ﬂows and stocks of highly skilled migrants as well as expatriates.
3 The Computation of Eﬀective Taxes on Labour
A prerequisite for our empirical analysis is information on eﬀective personal income
tax rates for diﬀerent income brackets. For this, we compute the eﬀective tax bur-
den on individuals earning 100% and ones earning 500% of the average wage in
the manufacturing sector for 49 countries in the year 2002 (see OECD, 2002; and
Heady, 2004).2 Accordingly, the average eﬀective personal income tax burden borne
by an employee (ITE) is deﬁned as the ratio of the labor income tax (T L) plus so-
cial security contributions paid by the employee (T SE1) and the overall gross wage
2The countries included in our data-set are the following: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.
4(w) plus the employer’s contributions (T SE2). The eﬀective tax burden borne by
the employer (ITR) is deﬁned as the ratio between the employer’s social security
contributions (T SE2) and the overall labor cost to the employer which includes the
gross wage (w) and the aforementioned contributions (T SE2). Hence, we have
ITE =
T L + T SE1
w + T SE2 ; ITR =
T SE2
w + T SE2. (1)
These two measures together make up the overall average eﬀective tax burden (T A):
T
A =
T L + T SE1 + T SE2
w + T SE2 . (2)
In particular, we use information from OECD (2002), PriceWaterhouseCoopers
(PWC), and the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) for the com-
putation of ITE and ITR. For instance, the following numbers for Croatia in 2002
lead to an eﬀective average tax rate on labor of 39.7% in that country.
Overview: Average eﬀective tax rates on labor in Croatia
1. Gross earnings 7282.1
2. Ded. for social sec. contributions (=7.) 1500.1
3. Personal Allowance 1898.7
4. Taxable income (=1-2-3) 3883.2
5. Tax liability 590.7
6. State and local income taxes 53.2
7. Employee soc. sec. contributions (=20.6% of 1.) 1500.1
8. Employer soc. sec. contributions (=17.1% of 1.) 1243
9. Eﬀective average tax rate (=(5.+6.+7.+8.)/(1.+8.)) 39.7 %
Apart from this, the progressivity of the personal income tax system is an im-
portant determinant of net wages, especially, the ones of high-skilled workers. To
account for the fact that high-skilled workers will, on average, earn relatively high
wages, we use the progression of the personal income tax system between 100%






Obviously, a stronger progressivity of a country’s personal income tax system in the
higher income brackets is reﬂected by a higher value of ITP500 100.
5As mentioned above, we compute these eﬀective tax rates for 49 countries. Then,
we merge them onto a data-set of bilateral ﬂows of skilled workers and stocks of ex-
patriates from these countries into OECD countries. Ultimately, we then account
for the diﬀerence in personal income tax rates of workers with an average income
between the resident and the source country as one determinant of bilateral skilled
worker migration ﬂows or stocks of expatriates. Moreover, we account for the diﬀer-
ence in the progressivity of the tax system as a separate determinant of these ﬂows
or stocks.
In the data at hand, the largest diﬀerence in the employee-borne average personal
income tax rate between the resident country and the source country—namely one
of 40.8 percentage points—pertains to emigrants from Mexico into Denmark. Other
large values for the resident-to-source country diﬀerential in average personal income
tax rates are obtained for migration ﬂows from Mexico to Germany (31.6 percentage
points), from Slovak Republic to Denmark (28 percentage points), and from Ireland
to Denmark (27.6 percentage points), respectively. A similar picture arises when
looking at the diﬀerence in the tax burden on employees earning ﬁve times the
average wage. There, the highest value is recorded for migration ﬂows from Mexico
to Denmark with 50.8 percentage points. A large dispersion also exists also for
migration ﬂows from Australia to Denmark, amounting to 47.9 percentage points.
However, as said before we capture the progressivity of the personal income tax
system by the measure ITP500 100. The largest diﬀerences in the resident-to-source
country progressivity of the tax system are found between Australia and Mexico
with around 4 percentage points, followed by the diﬀerence between new Zealand
and Mexico with 3.6 percentage points and Hungary and Mexico with 3.1 percentage
points.
4 Empirical Analysis of Personal Income Taxes as
a Determinant of Skilled Migration Flows
a. Empirical Hypotheses about the Impact of Personal Income Taxation on Expatri-
ates and Migration Flows
We may formulate the following hypotheses regarding the determinants of skilled
migration ﬂows. First, we expect skilled migrants on average to ﬂow into large coun-
tries. For instance, Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch (2008) put forward a theoretical
6model of skilled migrants where such migration ﬂows happen through and simultane-
ously with bilateral ﬂows of foreign direct investment (which favors large countries
to locate in). Second, since bilateral FDI stimulates skilled migration ﬂows and
the lion’s share of foreign direct investment happens within the OECD, we expect
skilled migration to be higher there than elsewhere, too. Third, similar to unskilled
migrants, we hypothesize geographical distance to reduce and adjacency (common
land borders) and common language characteristics between countries to raise skilled
migration ﬂows. Fourth, similar to other migrants, we expect skilled ones to enter
countries where the expected reference wage (in this case, for high income earners)
is high relative to the source country. Fifth, in contrast to less skilled migrants,
the aggregate unemployment rate should be fairly unimportant for skilled migrants’
choice of the country of residence.
Given these economic fundamentals, we expect the resident-to-source-country
tax diﬀerential to aﬀect skilled migration ﬂows negatively, irrespective of whether
we envisage employer-borne or employee-borne taxes. In particular, we would ex-
pect a high rate of progression of the personal income tax rate in the residence
country relative to the source country to reduce migration ﬂows. It is the task of
the subsequent section to assess these hypotheses.
b. Speciﬁcation and Data
The empirical models estimated below employ stocks of expatriates and, alter-
natively, ﬂows of skilled migrants between country-pairs as the dependent variables.
Skilled migrants are workers with either secondary or, alternatively, tertiary ed-
ucation. The corresponding data are made available by the OECD through the
Database on Immigration and Expatriates. The data are cross-sectional in nature
and for the year 2002.
With regard to personal income tax parameters, the aforementioned three vari-
ables enter the speciﬁcation: the resident-to-source country employee-borne as well
as the employer-borne personal income tax diﬀerential (as a fraction of income) for
the average wage earner, and the diﬀerential of the tax progression of the employee-
borne part in percent between the 500% and the 100% wage bracket in manufactur-
ing.
Apart from data on personal income tax rates, the set of explanatory variables
consists of two blocs of determinants. First, it includes source and destination
country labor market and demand variables. For instance, GDP enters as a measure
of country size (taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2007).
GDP is an indirect measure of labor market size (i.e., labor demand and supply
7as well as the matching probability of workers with ﬁrms). Furthermore, we use
unemployment rates, indicating a possible deterrent to migration ﬂows (also from the
World Development Indicators 2007). However, we should expect unemployment to
be much less important for skilled migration ﬂows or expatriates than for migration
ﬂows as such. Finally, we include wages of workers in manufacturing (collected from
OECD, 2002, and United Nations’ online-database on Wages in Manufacturing). We
have information about the average gross wage by country. Beyond that, we know
the wage at other moments of the distribution, for instance, the one at 500 percent
of the average wage. In the regressions presented here, we employ the resident-to-
source country high wage (at ﬁve times the average) diﬀerential in manufacturing
in most of the regressions. Yet, the availability of alternative moments of the wage
distribution is still important to determine the personal income tax schedule at
diﬀerent moments of the income distribution.
Second, we employ data associated with barriers to or the facilitation of cross-
border migration ﬂows of skilled workers or stocks of expatriates. In particular,
these are the log of bilateral distance between two countries’ capitals, a common
land border dummy variable, a dummy variable for common oﬃcial language in
the resident and the source country, and a dummy variable which is one whenever
both the resident and the source country are members of the OECD and zero else.
The distance, border, and language are from the geographical database made pub-
licly available by the Centre d’´ Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales
(CEPII).
c. Estimation Results
Econometrically, we employ Poisson and negative binomial pseudo maximum
likelihood model estimation to take care of zero bilateral expatriates and skilled mi-
gration ﬂows (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix are based on Eicker-White estimates which are robust to heteroskedasticity
of arbitrary form. We report parameter estimates and model characteristics for the
negative binomial model in Table 1 and marginal eﬀects of the tax parameters of
interest in Table 3. The corresponding results for the Poisson model can be found
in Tables 2 and 4.
< Tables 1-4 >
First of all, the results in Table 1 suggest that the residuals of the estimated
speciﬁcation are characterized by over-dispersion which is highly signiﬁcant. Hence,
8the negative binomial pseudo maximum likelihood model in Table 1 seems better
suited for estimation than the Poisson model in Table 2. The covariates are jointly
signiﬁcant in either model. Many of the estimated parameters are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, especially, with the negative binomial model. Interestingly, the
magnitude of the coeﬃcients is quite similar across the dependent variables in use,
expatriates or migrants with tertiary or secondary education.
All of the personal income tax parameters of interest are negative and signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero in Table 1. The results indicate that skilled migrants or
expatriates go less likely into a country if personal income tax rates (or their pro-
gression) are relatively high as compared to the country of origin. The parameters
of the tax variables of interest are also negative in Table 2, but income tax pro-
gression does not contribute signiﬁcantly to explain migration in the Poisson model.
However, as said before, the Poisson model is less suited than the negative binomial
model with the data at hand due to over-dispersion of the residuals.
The other covariates enter with the expected sign in Table 1 and they have
similar eﬀects in Table 2. A higher wage for well-paid workers (500 percent of the
average wage in the country) in the resident relative to the source country increases
skilled migration and so does GDP (although market size seems less important here
than wages). Unemployment rates enter positively, which seems counter-intuitive.
However, we would generally expect unemployment to be relatively unimportant for
skilled employment as well as expatriates or migrants relative to that of unskilled
workers. According to the remaining covariates, expatriates as well as skilled mi-
grants mainly tend to go into non-adjacent yet not too distant countries (see the
negative signs of both the distance and the contiguity parameters). The number of
expatriates and skilled migration is higher among OECD countries and economies
with a common oﬃcial language.
Since our emphasis is on the role of personal income taxation for migration, let
us focus on these variables now. While Tables 1 and 2 provide ﬁrst insights into
the role of personal income taxation for migration and expatriation, they do not
allow for an inference of their quantitative eﬀect. Tables 3 and 4 provide marginal
eﬀects of these variables for the negative binomial and the Poisson models. Notice
that the distributional assumptions are diﬀerent between these models. So it is not
surprising that the magnitude of the marginal eﬀects diﬀers between the two ap-
proaches. In general, the marginal eﬀects of the personal income tax rates are larger
in Table 3 than in Table 4. Quantitatively, income tax progression from the average
labor income to the tax bracket of an income of ﬁve times the average seems more
important than taxation of the average income. This seems plausible when focusing
on expatriates or skilled migrants. However, the eﬀect is only marginally signiﬁcant
9(hence, the conﬁdence interval around the point estimate is large) with expatriates.
Otherwise, the employee-borne part of taxation exerts a stronger negative impact
on cross-border ﬂows of workers than the employer-borne one.
As an alternative to the negative binomial and Poisson models, we also estimate
a Heckman (1979) selection model. The latter uses an indicator variable which is set
to one for non-zero bilateral expatriates or skilled migration ﬂows and zero else. The
selection equation is allowed to be correlated with an outcome equation for positive
stocks of expatriates or ﬂows of skilled migrants.3 In the outcome equation we use
the log of expatriates or skilled migrants as dependent variables.
< Tables 5-6 >
Table 5 summarizes the parameter estimates for both the selection and outcome
equations for the three dependent variables in use. According to the selection equa-
tion estimates, a higher resident-to-source country personal income tax progression
reduces the probability that a positive number of expatriates is observed. With
skilled migrants, especially a higher level of personal income taxation for average
workers reduces the likelihood of positive skilled migration ﬂows. The magnitude
of the parameters of the personal income tax variables in the outcome equations is
similar to that in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 6 summarizes marginal eﬀects under Heckman model estimation. As said
before, the elasticities are similar in Table 5 as compared to Tables 1 and 2. The
marginal eﬀects in Table 6 (expressed as elasticities) are slightly higher than in the
negative binomial model. To see this, multiply the elasticities in Table 6 with the
average number of expatriates or skilled migrants summarized in Table 7 of the
Appendix. However, the relative magnitude of the impact of income tax progression
and exmployee- as well as employer-borne tax rate diﬀerentials is similar to the one
in Tables 3 and 4. Overall, the conclusions drawn from fairly diﬀerent econometric
models for expatriates and skilled migrants seem quite robust.
3In contrast to the pseudo maximum likelihood models in Tables 1 and 2, Heckman’s model
assumes a diﬀerent data-generating process for zero versus non-zero outcomes and, even more
importantly, it assumes that selection into positive outcomes is correlated with the equation de-
termining the level of outcomes.
105 Concluding Remarks
This paper uses a large data-set on labor income taxation among 49 economies to
consider its impact on the stocks of expatriates and ﬂows of skilled migrants at the
bilateral level. We apply the OECD’s Taxing Wages Approach to a set of OECD
and non-OECD countries and provide descriptive evidence for the nexus between
labor taxation and migration of well-paid or skilled workers.
We then formulate parsimonious speciﬁcations to estimate the impact of three
variables capturing the role of labor taxation for cross-border ﬂows of workers:
employee- and employer-borne tax rates for average income earners, and the pro-
gressivity of the employee-borne tax rates at high income brackets (between the
average and ﬁve times the average wage). Econometrically, we employ count data
and sample selection models to respect the problem of zero-inﬂation with data on
expatriates and skilled migrants at the country-pair level.
The ﬁndings suggest that —among the considered income tax variables— the
progressivity of the tax system at high income brackets is quantitatively the most
important component for expatriates or migration. The second most important
indicator are employee-borne personal income tax rates for average personal incomes.
Employer-borne tax rates are the least important element among the three when it
comes to explain expatriates or migration ﬂows among the considered 49 countries.
11Appendix
Table 7 contains summary statistics for the dependent variables in use: the stock
of expatriates and ﬂows of migrants with tertiary and secondary education, respec-
tively. Table 8 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the personal income tax
variables as well as the other control variables included in the empirical models.
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